JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10228

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R2146

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TRANSCRIPT/REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/AND EXHIBITS AS LISTED

DATE : 01/10/76
PAGES : 96

SUBJECTS :
TESTIMONY OF E. HOWARD HUNT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/01/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 248-10

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SSCI BOX 248-10

State of Florida )
) SS:
County of Okaloosa )

AFFIDAVIT

E. HOWARD HUNT, JR., being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. On January 10, 1976, I was examined by Frederick D. Baron, a counsel for the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. On January 11, 1976, I was examined by both Mr. Baron and Howard Liebengood, another counsel for the Senate Select Committee. At both of these examinations I was accompanied by my counsel, Randall C. Coleman, and advised of my Constitutional rights.

2. I have read the transcripts of both of the above-mentioned examinations, and I hereby affirm that my testimony therein is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

E. Howard Hunt, Jr.
E. Howard Hunt, Jr.

Sworn to before me this sixth day of February, 1976.

John C. Henry
Notary Public

My Commission Expires Jan. 4, 1977

ORIGINAL

Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

R2146
INVENTORIED:
ON 5/23/77
BY [illegible]

# The United States Senate

TOP SECRET

## Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/3/77
BY EC

## Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
14-4-94

(1)(A)
(1)(B)

Saturday, January 10, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

might have directed me to this particular unit.

I was told that somewhere within the overall political and psychological staff there was located a man with a small office. This man's name was Pash, Colonel Boris Pash, and my understanding was that Colonel Pash had been doing business, let us say, with the Agency in West Germany for quite a while.

I sought out Colonel Pash. I was directed to his office and found sitting with him another Agency officer named [redacted] I'm not sure whether it is [redacted].

Mr. Baron. It's a Greek name. [redacted] is his correct first name, but he goes by [redacted].

Mr. Hunt. Very good. But in any case, he was known throughout my career as [redacted]. And I was at that point on, let's say, a search mission to determine whether the alleged capability of Colonel Pash in "wet affairs," which is how it was referred to, that is liquidations, would have any relevance to our particular problem of the Albanian disappointments.

Mr. Baron. By liquidations, you mean assassinations?

Mr. Hunt. Assassinations. Assassinations, kidnappings, removals, let's say.

This had been alleged to me. So I spoke to Colonel Pash in Mr. [redacted]'s presence. I explained the problem to him, although at that juncture I'm quite sure that we had not identified the Albanian suspect. So we were talking hypothetically

earlier, that when I first inquired around for the location of Colonel Pash and his assistant, the reaction I encountered was a rather jesting one, and the impression I gained was here were a couple of men who were drawing salaries and doing very little.

And so when Colonel Pash seemed reluctant to become involved in responding affirmatively to my questions, my inference was that Colonel Pash and [redacted] could well not have such a capability but for purposes of employment and status, this was the job they had. But they didn't want anyone to call upon them to activate their particular abilities.

Now that was my impression, and I was a little disgusted by it. I think I talked to the Chief of the PP staff later, who was of course well aware of the Albanian problem and I said I didn't get any satisfaction from Pash, but it doesn't really make any difference because we don't have the name of the suspected individual.

Mr. Baron. Just to stop here for a second and clear up some of these details, were you under the impression that what you called wet affairs, assassinations, kidnappings, or other removals from the scene of troublesome individuals was the primary function of this unit that Pash and [redacted] were running?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact the only. As far as I knew, they

had no other function. If they had another function, I was never made aware of what it was.

Do you know anything about Colonel Pash's background?

Mr. Baron. I know a bit, but if you think that there are relevant details to put on the background, go ahead.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I had not thought of Colonel Pash for years until I began reading a book called "Lawrence and Oppenheimer," and I saw quite a few references to Colonel Pash. I had known previously that he had been associated during the war with the Manhattan Project and that he had a security background. And as I believe I touched on briefly before, it was my impression that Pash had been active a couple of years at least before I knew him in West Germany with the sort of thing that we had been discussing so far today.

Mr. Baron. What kinds of stories had you heard about Pash's previous activities?

Mr. Hunt. Kidnappings mostly.

Mr. Baron. And where were those?

Mr. Hunt. West Germany and West Berlin.

Mr. Baron. Do you know the names of any of the victims of the kidnapping or any of the people involved other than Pash and [redacted]?

Mr. Hunt. I do not.

Mr. Baron. And are you aware from whatever source of any assassination planning or attempts that Pash was involved

in?

Mr. Hunt. I am not.

Mr. Baron. Does your answer include not only the period of time before you talked with Colonel Pash but after you talked with Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.

I might add that I was rather briefly at CIA headquarters at that time and within a very short period of time after I had had my interview with Colonel Pash, I was transferred to the Guatemala project, the overthrow of Guatemala.

Mr. Baron. Is that the reason why you did not follow up on the problem with this particular suspected double agent after not receiving satisfaction from Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. That certainly could have been one reason. On the other hand, I was chief of, I can see I'm really going to have to get into a lot more here. This is going to be dry and dull stuff for you.

[redacted] King Zog who was very upset about the disappearance and loss of all of his partisans in the operations that the Agency was conducting.

[redacted] -- the the counter-intelligence or espionage aspect, which is not my function, but

[redacted] Why were they being parachuted to their deaths in Albania? And that was my introduction to the whole scene in West Germany, where the balance of his retainers were being held by the CIA. Well, not being held, but where they were being housed and trained for Albanian operations.

Mr. Baron. Can you explain the term "retainer"?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I understood that when he finally got out of Albania, that he brought with him what I can best describe as retainers. That is bodyguards, members of his personal staff, probably some relatives. I think he had four or five sisters with him. But the able-bodied portion of those loyalists who came out with him we had largely taken over [redacted] And then he never saw them again. He naturally became apprehensive.

So that was my interest in what was happening to the Albanians that we parachuted in [redacted] I had no functional counter-espionage interest in the affair. This would have been handled and this was handled by the Chief of Counter-espionage for the Division.

Mr. Baron. Who would that have been at the time?

Mr. Hunt. I can't remember at this point.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Baron. But that would be the person primarily responsible for taking care of this double agent problem?

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of what happened with that suspected double agent?

Mr. Hunt. I have no idea because, as I may have indicated previously off the record, it became apparent some years later that the unfortunate fate of our Albanian agents was linked far more closely to the revelations of Kim Philby, the Soviet agent who was in direct liaison with us in Washington and in Great Britain, rather than any penetration, although the possibility of a penetration was of course always there. But I don't think that anybody was ever focused.

Again, I left for Latin American affairs. I left the Division about that time and I really never heard about it again. [redacted] the Albanian chief, departed for Southeast Asia, and the whole sort of complex of knowledgeable people was broken up through normal transfers and special activities like the Guatemala project.

Mr. Baron. Was [redacted] knowledeable about your approach to Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. Very likely he was, yes. I don't think I would have discussed anything with Colonel Pash about the matter without talking to [redacted] about it.

Mr. Baron. Who else would have known that you approached

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Colonel Pash with the idea in mind of seeing if an assassination or a kidnapping couldn't be arranged?

Mr. Hunt. The then Chief of Foreign Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence for the Division. And I think now that that was [redacted]. I think he wore both hats. He had both foreign intelligence responsibility and the counter-intelligence responsibility. And I might have told the division chief about it, although it was not, it had not achieved such stature at that point that I would have necessarily talked to the Division Chief, who I believe at that time was John Richardson of later Vietnam fame.

It's also possible that the Division Chief in that era was John Baker, now deceased, who left that division to become Chief of the PP staff, and that would have been a normal follow through for me if I had discussed it with John Baker, my direct Chief, and then to have discussed it with him when he was my staff chief in the overall political and psychological staff.

Mr. Baron. Anyone else who would have known about your approach to Colonel Pash or about --

Mr. Hunt. Or his function.

Mr. Baron. Yes, that Colonel Pash was considered to have assassinations as one of his functions.

Mr. Hunt. We had a Colonel Buffington who at that time was a member of the PP staff, the overall PP staff, and I think

that he would hav e been knowledgeable about it.

Mr. Baron. Was that Milton Buffington?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. I think he later went on and had a career in the Office of Security. Milton Buffington, yes.

Mr. Baron. Anyone else?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I have the names of three men who unfortunately are dead. I could give those names, though. Mr. C. Tracy Barnes, Mr. John Baker, who I've already mentioned, and Mr [redacted] These men were all at one time or another chiefs of the Agency's PP staff.

Another man now living to the best of my knowledge who might well have had knowledge of Pash's function was the then-chief of the Economic Warfare staff of the PP staff and his

name was Gates Lloyd. He later became the Deputy Director for Support of the Agency.

There's a man named [redacted] who was in the Psychological Warfare Branch of the PP staff. I believe at that time there was an International Organizations Branch which later became the International Organizations Division, then headed by Cord Myer, Jr., and his Deputy at that time was Tom Braden, the now-columnist whose wife has just ascended to the Executive Office Building. There were members of the Labor Branch, and I'm trying to think of that branch of office that was down the hall.

There was a labor branch. The people in there might know. There was a lady lawyer named Carol somebody who was very knowledgeable about what was going on in that area.

Mr. Baron. Knowledeable about Pash's activities?

Mr. Hunt. Well, in the sense that when you have an adjoining office, you usually pretty much know what the other fellow is doing. Just in that sense, because her function in the labor branch had nothing to do with Pash, to my knowledge.

What I'm trying to do here is to give you sort of a congeries of people alive and dead who would have had contact knowledge, at the very least, of what Pash's function was.

Mr. Baron. Were each of these units referred to as PB with a number following it?

Operations and OPC, the staff structure emerged as follows:

Reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans, i.e. Frank Wisner, whose Chief of Operations then was Richard Helms, this is the Clandestine Services Organization. There was our support staff, the PP staff, the Foreign Intelligence staff, the Counter-Intelligence, Counter-Espionage staff, and of course the famous staff "D".

Also reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans were all of the geographical divisions, such as Western Europe, Southeast Europe, Asia, Near East, and so forth.

Mr. Baron. Now at this point Frank Wisner was DDP, Richard Helms was his deputy.

Mr. Hunt. Richard Helms was his Chief of Operations.

Mr. Baron. All right. The Chief of the PP staff was --

Mr. Hunt. Either Tracy Barnes or John Baker or [redacted]

Mr. Baron. And you were located on the South European --

Mr. Hunt. Southern Europe Division.

Mr. Baron. Who headed that division at that point?

Mr. Hunt. Either John Baker or John Richardson.

So as you see, I had a line responsibility to the Chief of the Southeast Europe Division, as indicated in Exhibit 3. At the same time I had a functional responsibility to the Chief of the PP staff, who was Mr. Barnes or Mr. Baker or [redacted] just as the Chief of FI for the Southeast Europe

Mr. Hunt. Does this satisfy your request?

Mr. Baron. It does, indeed.

Of all of the individuals that you have just mentioned, which ones do you know to your own certainty were clearly knowledgeable of Boris Pash's activities?

Mr. Hunt. Artie Lazarus would be the first one, and after that I can only speculate. I would have to assume that Doug Blaufarb acquired knowledge of it, but perhaps he acquired knowledge through me. I'm not sure. I have made a list of other people whom I have not mentioned who conceivably, by virtue of personal contact or functional responsibility, might well have been aware of Pash's true functional responsibility within the Agency.

Mr. Baron. Before I ask you to tick off that list, let's make it clear that all of the names, in addition to Artie Lazarus, are names that you have given as people who are likely to have been knowledgeable of Pash's activities because of their place in the organization structure at that time.

Mr. Hunt. That's correct, or as I have indicated in some cases, as with the PP labor branch by virtue of physical proximity to that office.

Mr. Baron. Okay. Why don't you now just run very briefly through the names of other people who you think could conceivably have been knowledgeable of Pash's function?

Mr. Hunt. In some cases I'm going to have to give you their

title designation rather than the name of the individual because so much time has passed, I have simply forgotten who it was in that particular era.

[redacted], who at that time was a member of the German branch of the Western Europe Division, he has since retired and is running his family's [redacted]usiness in New York. Certainly the then Chief of Western Europe Division, of which Germany was a functional part and the Chief of Operations of Western Europe should know.

I would think that Jim Angleton, who would have had direct knowledge and always was the Chief of the CI/CE staff. The Chief of base in [redacted] if in fact Pash conducted any activities in that area, certainly the Chief of base in [redacted] would have been knowledgeable about it.

Also, the Chief of base at [redacted] which was where we had the [redacted]peration going on. I don't know whether Bill Harvy, that is William Harvy, at that time was Chief of Operations [redacted] or whether he was simply running the tunnel, but Harvy might well have some knowledge of Pash.

I would certainly assume that when we're talking about liquidations and that sort of thing that the Agency's overall Office of Security somewhere within it must have been involved, such German Division personnel as might be available today, West German, and I would also suggest that General Cushman might be knowledgeable for this reason.

End 1A, b. 1B

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

It was about that time that General Cushman was still assigned to the CIA. I could be wrong about that but I seem to have a memory of Cushman being around in those days. He was then a Colonel. I had associated with him. In fact, we had shared an office at one time, but that was several years earlier. I would place it about early 1949. But I'm quite sure that Cushman was around in that period of time and involved with the PP staff, though what his function was I don't know.

Now there are alive two close friends of mine who were then members of the PP staff, [redacted] and [redacted] These are men who in effect established the PP staff for Frank Wisner and then left to go on to other things. They are both well known writers.

Mr. Baron. Let me just return to one name that you mentioned and that is William Harvey.

Did you -- first, generally, what was the nature of your operational relationships to William Harvey after this period? Did you have any?

Mr. Hunt. I never had any, no. In fact, I've only seen him once in my life, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Baron. As you may know, William Harvey was tasked in 1961 with setting up an executive action capability at the CIA, tasked originally by Richard Bissell to carry out assassinations if required.

because we're going to slop over into this other matter that Mr. Liebengood wants to talk about tomorrow.

Mr. Baron. Well, why don't we hold off then, except that for this one question, which is are you aware of any involvement that Dr. Gunn had in assassination planning?

Mr. Hunt. No, I'm not because I'm just not familiar with assassination planning. And specifically, for that reason, I'm not aware of any involvement that Dr. Gunn might have had.

Mr. Baron. Let's return now to the point of departure, which was your conversation with Colonel Pash and the events that led up to it.

Who were your supervisors that gave you the impression that Colonel Pash was prepared to carry out assassinations?

Mr. Hunt. I wish I could give you a distinct name. I think I covered that in an impressionistic way by saying that Tracy Barnes and John Baker, who were at different times sequentially chiefs of the PP staff, it seems to me that Barnes was probably the one who indicated that Pash had such a capability.

I know that I did not get it from [redacted] and I'm quite sure that my information did not come from within the Southeast Europe Division. It must have come accordingly from the Political and Psychological staff, the contacts there, and I would have to say Tracy Barnes or John Baker are the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

most likely.

Mr. Baron. And neither of those two men are alive today?

Mr. Hunt. That's right.

Mr. Baron. Did whoever gave you the information about Boris Pash indicate to you that there were any other units in the CIA that could take care of such problems by means of assassination?

Mr. Hunt. No. My distinct impression and recollection is the function, if indeed it existed, and I believed it then to have existed as I do today, was centralized or focused in Colonel Pash and [redacted].

Mr. Baron. Now what would have been the formal title of the unit that Colonel Pash and [redacted] were running?

Mr. Hunt. If it had one, I never knew it.

Mr. Baron. Can you add any other detail to the record on your talk with Colonel Pash and his reaction to your request that he consider on a general level the planning of an assassination of a suspected double agent?

Mr. Hunt. Well, as I recall it, my conversation with him was a relatively brief one. I stepped in the door, met him, saw [redacted], who I knew briefly, or at least knew him by sight, and I sat down and I said, we have this problem in the Albanian branch. We may need somebody liquidated in Western Germany. Can you handle it if that day comes, or if it comes to that?

And he seemed a little startled. I have already indicated that. What I'm trying to do now is to refine my thoughts more than I did previously when we were taking sort of a wide swipe at the canvas.

Colonel Pash indicated or said to me that it was a matter that would have to be approved by higher authority and as a relatively low ranking officer in those days, I thought he was probably referring to Frank Wisner. And indeed, he may have. It never got pushed up to Frank Wisner's level because there no direct approach or a request for such approval was ever made.

I left with the impression that Colonel Pash was glad that he wasn't going to have any business for me or that he had successfully deflected whatever approach I might be making to him because it would give him and [redacted] an opportunity to drink more coffee and to draw their salaries from the Agency while affecting to do a job that they were perhaps not equipped to do.

Now again, that impression I had when I left him was at variance with what I had heard before I came in, where I heard he and [redacted] or he at least had been active in West Germany in wet affairs, particularly kidnappings and that sort of thing.

Mr. Baron. And you carried into his office the impression that Colonel Pash was a man who could carry off an assassination

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss this matter with anyone other than Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. In that context?

Mr. Baron. In the context of assassinations or kidnapping.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I wasn't involved in plotting or planning any kidnappings. Again, I would suggest that I might very well have gone back to [redacted] who was the most interested individual, because he was responsible at the branch level [redacted] as an operational tool, whereas, I had an overall political responsibility [redacted] And I have described the background of that, the rubric under which I became interested in the Albanian problem in the first place, and then having talked to Pash, it would have been only natural for me to have said to [redacted] look, I've talked with Pash and he says it will have to be approved by higher authority. Now have you gotten, we don't have a body yet, but when you get a name to put on the target, at that point you will have to carry the ball and take it on up the line.

Mr. Baron. And you never heard anything further about it?

Mr. Hunt. No, probably because I went within, I think, a comparatively few weeks off to the Guatemala operation.

Mr. Baron. Did anyone ever mention it to you, say did [redacted] ever mention it to you again?

Mr. Hunt. No. I next saw [redacted] in [redacted] in

End 1B, b. 2A

it would be about '57 or '58, and I had dinner in his home in Taipei, and I'm quite sure I said at that time, whatever happened to Boris Pash, or what do you hear from Boris?

Now he was a rather unusual individual to say the least, and I don't think [redacted] told me that he was dead. I don't know who told me that Boris, that Pash died, but whatever he said, it was, well, he was okay the last time I saw him and that was the last time we ever discussed it.

Mr. Baron. And you didn't discuss this request?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Where did you receive the impression that Colonel Pash was dead?

Mr. Hunt. I guess when, either from reading the Lawrence and Oppenheimer book or from the newspapers, from the Crewdson story. I don't think at the first level when I began recalling the story, I don't think I was aware that Boris Pash was dead.

Mr. Baron. In the Crewdson story there is an allusion to the fact that Colonel Pash is probably dead.

Are you saying that that came from Crewdson's research and not from yourself?

Mr. Hunt. Oh, yes, that came from Crewdson's research, not mine.

Mr. Baron. This is more than a minor note on the record, Colonel Bash is not dead.

Mr. Hunt. Oh, good, I thought he was dead.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

my assumption at that time was that authorization by Frank Wisner would have been all that would have been required to proceed with the project had it ever materialized. That is the Chief of the Clandestine Services.

Now whether Frank would have been required to go to Allen Dulles, I rather doubt it. I think it is something that he would have been able to authorize himself.

Mr. Baron. All right. Let me ask you now before we get into Colonel Pash's version of the story, which we will, whether it is possible that you are confusing the time periods here?

So as not to hold anything back from you, Colonel Pash has said that the time period has to be off because he retired from the Agency, or left the Agency in probably late '51. It's possible that it went into 1952. But he wasn't with the Agency in any capacity after '52. And in fact, his status was that of a military officer who had been detailed to the Agency from approximately 1948 to '52.

Now does that affect your recollection in any way of the period '54 to '55 as the period when your conversation with Boris Pash took place?

Mr. Hunt. Well, from 1950 to 1953, I was in Mexico as Chief of the OPC station.

Mr. Baron. And where were you from the time that you joined the Agency until you went to Mexico?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Hunt. I was a member of the PP staff.

Mr. Baron. Is it possible that your conversation with Boris Pash about the assassination of a suspected double agent took place in that time period?

Mr. Hunt. I would have to say it's possible, yes.

Mr. Baron. Would you have been dealing with East European problems or --

Mr. Hunt. No, I was dealing with West European problems.

Mr. Baron. I'm sorry. Would you have been dealing with a problem like this one, a problem with a suspected Albanian double agent in West Germany during that time period?

Mr. Hunt. I can't recall having done so. The West European Division had its own PP staff officer and he would have been the one to take it up, whereas my recollection is that this was generated at a later time when I was in the Southeast European Division and had a direct reason to become interested in the matter.

I have to say that it is possible, but I would say maybe 5 percent possible.

Mr. Baron. And you accord so small a possibility to the hypothesis that you actually talked to Pash about this problem in '49 or '50 because you were not involved in operations in West Germany at that point.

Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

Mr. Baron. And [redacted] at that

point?

Mr. Hunt. No, no. He was not.

Mr. Baron. Where were you in '49 and '50 physically?

Mr. Hunt. Physically I was in the JRK building with the PP staff and my direct supervisor at that time was [redacted] who I have mentioned earlier.

Mr. Baron. Did you travel to West Germany during that period of time?

Mr. Hunt. No, I did not.

Mr. Baron. In the later period, '50, '54, and '55, that you were discussing, did you travel often to West Germany?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. You were stationed in Washington?

Mr. Hunt. I was stationed in Washington and from the period after I left Mexico, which was in, I think, March of '54 for about the ensuing year when I left for the Guatemala project, I was in Washington or the SE Europe Division. So I had that continuous almost year there.

Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that adds to your sense of the probabilities that this conversation took place in '54 and '55?

Mr. Hunt. No. My restructuring is as I have given it to you, my recollections.

Mr. Baron. Okay. Let me ask you the same question in maybe a straightforward manner.

political affairs, and his was the 7th, which had less well defined functions. And [redacted] was a member of that unit.

Do you recall any dealings that you had in your earliest period of service with the CIA with PB7, now that I've refreshed your recollection?

Mr. Hunt. Not as such, no. Does Colonel Pash define what his functions were in the PB7?

Mr. Baron. Before I answer that one, let me ask you one.

Mr. Hunt. I've been trying to develop a helpful colloquy here.

Mr. Baron. This is very helpful.

Do you recall any charters that any of those planning branches had?

Mr. Hunt. At this juncture, no. I was only aware that, I think mine was PB2. This is when I first went in in 1949 or 1950. I think that was [redacted]utfit.

Mr. Baron. Colonel Pash described the charter of PB7 as giving PB7 responsibility for such other functions as the six other units didn't perform.

Does that square with your recollection of what he was doing in those early days?

Mr. Hunt. Well, you see, I don't associate Colonel Pash with the very early days. I associate him with a later period, about three years or five years later.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any specific recollection of Colonel

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Pash's activities in the years 1949 to 1952?

Mr. Hunt. Not at all, no. My only other collateral recollection is that Colonel Pash was said to have come to us. He was recently assigned in Germany and he had come to us from there. That was all that I knew.

Mr. Baron. [redacted] who has also testified this past week on this subject, said that his recollection of the charter of PB7 was that it gave PB7 responsibility for assassinations, kidnappings and such other functions as higher authority may assign or as were not being performed by other units.

Does that square with the impression that you were given by your superiors of the functions of Colonel Pash's unit?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. I didn't even know that [redacted] was still alive. So [redacted] then supports my functional recollection, let's say.

Mr. Baron. Let's introduce as Exhibit 6 an article in the New York Times dated January 8th, 1976, headed "Retired Colonel Denies Heading CIA Unit for Assassinations."

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 6)

with real certainty that no such conversation took place and that even in terms of exploring the possibility of assassination planning or inquiring into the capability for assassination planning, he maintains that assassinations were never raised with him, what do you then have to say about his testimony?

Mr. Hunt. I would have to say that his perceptions and mine were at variance and that we were engaged in some sort of an Aesopian dialogue in which neither of us understood what the other was saying.

I had no other reason to approach him. I had never heard of the man except in that particular context.

Mr Baron. And there was no other reason for them discussing capabilities for an assassination?

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any specific function that Colonel Pash performed with the CIA after the date of 1952?

Mr. Hunt. Well, my recollection is that I saw him in '54 and '55 and that's the only specific function that I can relate him to.

Mr. Baron. Now you have drawn a chart of the PP staff, Exhibit 4, that locates Colonel Pash and [redacted] on the PP staff.

Is it possible that they served on the PP staff before the date the Colonel Pash gives as his retirement date from the

CIA, which is sometime in '52?

Mr. Hunt. Is it possible? Yes, I believe it's possible because [redacted] was one of the original people in OPC.

Mr. Baron. At what point did OPC merge or was it transformed?

Mr. Hunt. Well, it merged with OSO, I think, in 1953 when I was [redacted] in Mexico in '53, and I came out of there in, I think, March of '54, I left Mexico.

By that time the merger had taken place.

Mr. Baron. So is it possible that this chart could have been a chart of the PP staff as it operated under the OPC structure, the 453?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact, I don't think that there was any particular change from the PB to the PP era.

Mr. Baron. The reason for my own confusion here is that Colonel Pash and [redacted] have both said that at the point when OPC was merged, or at some point shortly thereafter, PB7 was abolished and they don't know what became of it. They say the functions that these seven planning branches performed were scrambled and reorganized and they were never sure exactly who carried through the functions that had previously been assigned to PB7.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I never heard any more about it.

Just for perhaps a bit more clarification, the labor

unit or branch as it appeared in the PP staff following the merger, that had the same function and the same personnel as let's say whatever PB enumerated or numerical designations. So it's just a question of terminology. I can see that for chronological purposes you are interested in how I recall it, whether I recall it by a PB numercial designation or by -- But since I never knew what the Pash-[redacted] unit was designated, whether it was designated by a word or by a number, it doesn't help me at all. And for that reason I can't be of more assistance to you.

Just go see Colonel Pash. He's in such and such an office down there.

Mr. Baron. Off the record for a second.

(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Baron. For the record now, while we were off the record we agreed to continue this session a while to get into one or two other areas. But I have a couple of questions to tag on to the end of this one.

First of all, [redacted], in his testimony to the Committee, said that he had no recollection of a conversation with you where he was present, and you discussed assassination of a double agent, or the planning for such a mission with Colonel Pash and himself.

Do you, even having heard his testimony, still have a clear recollection that [redacted] was present when you

had this conversation?

Mr. Hunt. I do, because to the best of my knowledge and belief, it was the first time that I had met [redacted] That is, I had seen him in the corridors, but it was the first time that I was able to append a name to the particular individual who I had come to recognize visually.

My memory is further jogged in this respect, that [redacted] having identified me as a member of the SE division of the staff, at a later time but not much later, talked to me about the possibility of his being assigned to the SE division. And my recollection of the conversation is that [redacted] told me that he was a great friend of [redacted] and that this friendship should be put to use for the Agency's benefit, and it could be best done by his being transferred to SE division for ultimate assignment to Athens.

Mr. Baron. Do you have from anything in your experience in the CIA any personal animosity toward Colonel Pash or [redacted]

Mr. Hunt. On the contrary. I've always regarded myself as a friend of [redacted] and I only had one contact with Boris Pash. And I have no feeling about him one way or the other except that in his recent book I read about his involvement in the Manhattan Project and I certainly admired his contribution to national security in that era.

End 2A, b. 2B

Mr. Baron. In [redacted] testimony, he gave us an

account of an incident when he was stationed at [redacted] and he said that he had written a cable to CIA headquarters outlining a propaganda program because he was involved in propaganda operations at that point. And he said, unbeknownst to him, someone else in his station with the approval of the Chief of Station attached an extra paragraph to this cable which suggested the assassination of Chou En Lai in preparation for the Bandoeng Conference where Chou En Lai was supposed to be an important spokesman on behalf of many Asian nations.

And the way that [redacted] recounted the incident, he knew nothing about the paragraph that had been attached to his cable until the reply came back very strongly in the negative and eventually, a high ranking CIA official came out to [redacted] to reprimand everyone involved in the incident for suggesting assassination.

Do you have any recollection of that incident?

Mr. Hunt. No, I have no knowledge. What year does [redacted] refer to because I was in [redacted] in Tokyo from, oh, about '55 to '56 or '57. And I would have seen most of the traffic that came out of [redacted] in that period of time. But I don't know if -- I know that [redacted] stayed on in [redacted] much after my time in the Far East.

I don't know when the Bandoeng Conference took place. I remember it, of course, but I don't remember the year.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Baron. It appears to me that the Bandoeng Conference took place, according to [redacted] testimony, in 1955 and that the incident he was describing was either in '55 or late in '54.

Mr. Hunt. I had no recollection of it whatever. [redacted] is not suggesting that is some basis for personal animosity, I trust.

Mr. Baron. No. He did say, though, that you might have had knowledge of that suggestion, although he wasn't sure of it. He said you were involved at that time in a place where you might have seen cable traffic like that.

Mr. Hunt. That's quite right, but I never saw that traffic.

Mr. Baron. Let me pick up one last general question for the moment at least on assassinations.

Do you have any knowledge of even the consideration of assassinations at high levels of the American governemnt?

In other words, we have been using the term higher authority and I would like to use it for the moment now to refer to the level of the DCI or the National Security Council, the President, his close White House advisors, Cabinet officials, and the DCI.

Do you have any knowledge of any people at that level seriously considering assassination planning?

Mr. Hunt. No, none. I think you have to bear in mind

to me and I was surprised when on invasion day Castro was alive. I now realize from testimony that Harvey and others have given that the matter had been discussed long before my arrival on the scene and it was in hand one way or the other.

Mr. Baron. When was your arrival on the scene?

Mr. Hunt. Spring of 1960. I transferred up, I actually made my trip to Havana the summer of 1960, and then we had the Bay of Pigs invasion the following April of '61.

Mr. Baron. Now it is my own recollection of our assassination report that no action was taken to carry out an assassination plan against Castro as early as the spring of 1960.

Did something --

Mr. Hunt. No. I've giving you, I guess, a bureaucratic answer. I was officially transferred back to Washington in the spring of 1960 and I took some leave en route in Spain [redacted]

Eventually I made my way back to Washington in the spring and early summer and got on the scene within a few days of my actually reporting into the project managers, i.e., Bissell and Barnes, who decided I would go down to Havana for a period of time, and I went down for about a week and came back, and by that time we were talking maybe July or so.

Mr. Baron. July of '60?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Before we move away from Cuban operations, let me show you one cable that we have which is from Madrid and it appears to be to CIA headquarters because it is marked IN 75100, and it is dated September 16, 1964 in handwriting that was put on the copy that we have by the Agency.

This is not the original copy of the cable but it appears to be a copy that was deleted and paraphrased for the purposes of providing it to the Committee in the early days of our inquiry.

We will mark this as Exhibit 7.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 7)

Mr. Hunt. That can't conceivably have been a reference to me.

Mr. Baron. Why is that?

Mr. Hunt. Because I had not been involved in Cuban activities for more than three years at that time. I was purposely isolated from all Cuban activities after the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Baron. You said you did operate out of Madrid for a period of time but it was later than September of '64?

Mr. Hunt. No. Let me clarify that.

I was sent to Madrid in either '64 or '65. I can't recall which, and I stayed there less than a year. [redacted] My communications were handled independently between myself and Tom Karramessines, who was then Deputy Director for Plans.

This was a project that had been laid on by Dick Helms. [redacted] and I had no Cuban activities of any kind.

Mr. Baron. And did you have any knowledge of a relationship, to a plan to assassinate Castro, supposedly to take place during a university ceremony?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Let's move on now to an entirely different area, and I will ask you to begin by describing your general role in the middle of the 1960s on the CA staff with regard to

press publications or press placements or any responsibilities you may have had for media relations.

Mr. Hunt. After Allen Dulles's resignation and retirement, I was assigned for about a period of a week to the CA staff and I then transferred to the newly set up Domestic Operations Division under Tracy Barnes, which was really the Commercial Operations Division, although it was never so-called.

I was the first Chief of Covert Action for the Domestic Operations Division and we inherited as a new division a number of projects that had been running for a period of time, that had been run by the commercial staff of the Agency and by a number of the geographic divisions.

The purpose of turning these ongoing projects over to the Domestic Operations Division was to centralize contacts with publishers in the United States for the benefit of geographic divisions such as the Asian or Far East Division which might want a book published on [redacted] for a particular purpose. They would come to Tracy Barnes with a particular request.

And I should say that the relationship with the [redacted] Publishing Company had been in existence for quite a period of time and I think they were managed by Cord Myer International Division, if I'm not mistaken, or possibly the CA staff. But what we received were ongoing operations. We were sent the case files for the [redacted] project, for the [redacted] project, for [redacted]

organization, which had been operating out of [redacted] Building in Washington. We had a project in [redacted] which I visited on one occasion called [redacted] which we ran out of a [redacted] Virginia office.

I had no personal media contacts with American magazines or newspapers, if that is the thrust of your question.

Mr. Baron. Actually, I'm interested in this whole area, both contacts with specific reporters or media people domestically or contacts with publishing houses or contacts abroad in the publishing field.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I've given you the names of the publishing houses that we had contact with. I did on one occasion meet and I can't recall the purpose of it, it was a very large textbook publishing house and their main offices were in New Jersey. If I had an annual for publishers, I could pull it out.

But beside from that publishing house, we never did any business with them. I don't recall of any publishing houses beyond [redacted] that is trade publishers, that we dealt with.

We had our own press agency, [redacted] which I imagine you're quite familiar with.

Mr. Hunt. Can you describe the standard mode of operating with these various publishing outlets?

In other words, how would you have supplied them with

material? Would you urge them to publish a manuscript they already had from another source? Would you give them a manuscript that CIA personnel had written under a pseudonym?

Mr. Hunt. I don't think that ever took place, to my knowledge.

What I recall is [redacted] meeting with Tracy Barnes and me or individually, either in Washington or New York during this period and saying I have a great book I would love to publish, but it's not economically feasible, and I think it would be good for you people abroad for the following reasons. And we might come up with the differential or we might not.

I don't recall any Agency-created manuscripts that were sent to [redacted] or for that matter, any other publisher.

I recall we had a lot of accounting problems with [redacted] and finally we got really almost bogged down in arguments about back copies. It was a little on the nightmarish side. We did turn out some good books, but I couldn't give you a title at this point. But I'm sure that they are a matter of record within the Agency.

Mr. Baron. What was the nightmarish aspect of it?

Mr. Hunt. Well, apparently, before the project came under DOD, it had been handled on a very freewheeling basis by the previous project managers. [redacted] got everything he wanted from the Agency in terms of subsidy money and expense money and publicity money and that sort of thing and when we took

it over it was brought under -- I hesitate to use the term professional management, but I do so in a qualified sense in that I was the only one, I guess, who knew anything about the publishing industry, who had ever been connected with the project. So I knew a little about it.

And at that time, with the help of our own commercial people within the Division, our accountants and auditors and so forth determined that there were a number of aspects of our fiduciary relationship with the [redacted] company that would bear greater investigation.

So the relationship from a freewheeling one prior to our DOD managerial take-over, it became from a freewheeling thing, it became sort of an unpleasant continuous argument about dollars and cents, rather than functional matters.

Mr. Baron. Out of what funds at the CIA did these monies come from that we were giving to [redacted]

Mr. Hunt. I wouldn't have any idea, project money.

Mr. Baron. Who signed off on the project money?

Mr. Hunt. Well, it would depend on how much it cost. I think that Karamessines could sign off up to $50,000 and beyond that it had to be signed off on by Helms, I think. That's my best recollection. And I don't know -- as annual review was conducted, and of course the division chief had to approve it.

Mr. Baron. Did the operation involve companies other than

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

the ones you've mentioned? In other words, supplying funds to companies other than the ones you've already mentioned?

Mr. Hunt. I don't know of any. None that I knew of. I would be very surprised if a memorandum showed up saying that we were dealing with Random House, for example. I just don't recall now.

Mr. Baron. Was there any other aspect to your liaison with these publishing houses other than their seeking funds to publish books that you were interested in having published?

Mr. Hunt. Only this, that the USIA was, I think, finally brought into a formal relationship with DOD, at least my part of it, and the head of the book division at USIA and I would meet from time to time and he would indicate that he had a good one that we really ought to do rather than USIA and vice versa. And he knew fully of the Praeger relationship.

Mr. Baron. Can you describe the process that you would go through to ensure the publication of a book that the CIA was interested in having published? An example that I was given by somebody on our staff who has been looking into this was books written by or ghosted for Chinese defectors.

Mr. Hunt. As I recall it, the Chinese branch sort of ran a parallel operation. I don't recaall their coming through us. I don't recall a defector book when I was in that particular job. What I do recall is, I remember the Near East Branch brining to our attention a book that they

would like to have [redacted] publish, and it had to do with the [redacted] dispute, the name of which I can't recall. So the manuscript would have been read by [redacted] or his principal assistant, and he would give an indication of what he thought the marketability was. And at that point -- well, in this instance, we got the funds from the Near East Division. When it came down to that, why should DOD, who had no interest in the [redacted] dispute, provide money for that particular piece of propaganda. So the money would be transferred somehow from the Near East Division's allocation. It would be their project, but we would be the managers of it when it got down to the point of dealing face to face with [redacted] on the matter. My office would keep the division apprised of the project, when publication could be expected, and so forth.

Mr. Baron. Were there any other CIA publishing proprietaries than the two you have mentioned, [redacted]

Mr. Hunt. That I had personal knowledge of within the Domestic Operations Division, no.

Mr. Baron. You qualified that by saying within the Domestic Operations Division. Were there others?

Mr. Hunt. Because the international operations or International Organizational Division under Cord Myer, ran quite a few things in conjunction with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, for example. Radio Free Europe, those things that went on.

Mr. Baron. Did CIA do ghostwriting for non-CIA publications?

Mr. Hunt. I ghosted a couple of -- I'm very reluctant to go into this, although I have discussed it with John Crowdson. But this is another one of those difficult areas where it's very hard for me to prove.

There came a time in the spring of, I think it was the spring of about 1969, when the Soviet Russia Division asked me if I could cause to have published something on the -- by this time I was no longer with the Domestic Operation Division. I was with Western Europe -- on the increasing use by the [redacted]nd things like that, and Christ, I hope this doesn't get out.

And so I went to Helms. Howard Osborne was then Chief of the Division, as I recall. He was late Director of Security, and this had been staffed out. And I prepared the article and it appeared in large portions unchanged under the byline of [redacted] And it was not a fabricated article. It was just information which was supplied which he wrote somewhat in his own style, and there was a second article which appeared a month or two months later, and this was done by Dick Helms.

Mr. Baron. Also under [redacted] byline?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. You could understand the difficulties involved here and I don't need any more enemies. I have plenty.

Now that is my own personal contribution to that sort of thing. But I can't think of anything else that was done.

Mr. Baron. By other people? Was it a general practice to supply either prefabricated articles or the material for articles to favorable press contacts in this country?

Mr. Hunt. Well, we know about the [redacted] book, [redacted] which was largely a cooperative venture with the Agency, and that was done by the SR Division.

You are aware of that, aren't you?

Now in that case, you see, the SR reached out on its own. Penkoski Papers was another example. We had nothing to do with that in DOD. That was done, again, by SR division. And I can understand why.

But basically, in answer to your question, I have given you everything that I have personal knowledge of.

Mr. Baron. When you made the arrangement with [redacted]

Mr. Hunt. I made no arrangement with him.

Mr. Baron. Who handled liaison with him?

Mr. Hunt. Dick Helms.

Mr. Baron. And was that a one-on-one arrangement or were there other people knowledgeable?

Mr. Hunt. I believe it was a one-on-one, old school tie arrangement.

Mr. Baron. Was there any list kept at the CIA of favorable

[redacted] organization. I felt that a strict construction of the CIA charter made the project quite suspect because if we were doing a book, for example, o[redacted] Communism, who was the target? It would have been highly inappropriate for United States citizens to be the target of the particular book, and we did a hell of a good book on [redacted] Communism. It became about this thick. I can't recall the title.

End Tape 2B

If your targets are foreign, then where are they? They don't all necessarily read English, and we had a [redacted] So unless the book goes into a lot of languages or it is published in India, for example, where English is a lingua franca, then you have some basic problems. And I think the way this was rationalized by the project review board that looked over the [redacted] operation, and the [redacted] and [redacted] and things like that was that the ultimate target was formed, which was true, but how much of the [redacted] output actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable.

Now, in the case of [redacted] the material was physically mailed from Washington to foreign targets, the [redacted] newspapers, I think particularly the [redacted] Agency was a client. The mere fact that the project was rooted in the United States gave it sort of a credibility lustre abroad in that particular era. If it came out of Washington then it was probably okay.

But I -- [redacted] had no domestic U.S. papers as clients. What I'm trying to get at is that DOD handled operations which were based domestically in the United States, the commercial operations, and this includes proprietary airlines and things like that, whose ultimate target was abroad. The principal target or even a tangential target was not the United States citizen.

Mr. Baron. But, with anything that was published in English, the United States citizenry would become a likely audience for the publication?

Mr. Hunt. A likely audience, definitely.

Mr. Baron. Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English were kept out of or away from the American reading public?

Mr. Hunt. It was impossible because [redacted] was a commercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read. Again I say it was a matter of great difficulty. Mr. Barnes resolved all that philosophically, and I simply carried out the dicta.

Mr. Baron. What was your philosophical opinion of the danger of propagandizing Americans?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I knew that it was not a part of the Agency charter, and it was a matter that the USIA looked at. I talked about it occasionally. The USIA coincidentally had come under some criticism at that time for subsidizing certain publishers in the United States. That became known; I don't recall how. I discussed with the USIA book man and with Barnes the danger that we might be criticized for the same reasons. I was never enchanted with the [redacted] operation. I thought it cost far too much money and had minimal benefits abroad, and further, we had the liability, the vulnerability to quite reasonable critcism that we had U.S. citizens as a

target, or an audience, I should say.

Mr. Baron. Were there any precautions taken against dissemination in America of publications by CIA proprietaries in English?

Mr. Hunt. Proprietaries, well, my only personal knowledge is the [redacted] operation which I say was simply mailed out of Washington. That was the only precaution, rather than our people mailing them themselves.

Mr. Baron. Were any techniques used to prevent contamination of American intelligence by picking up on things that the CIA was actually publishing or arranging to have published?

Mr. Hunt. I would assume so, and I would guess that that would be done in the first instance by the knowledgeability of the reports officers in the various geographic divisions at headquarters who would scan newspapers, for example, or they would receive raw reports from [redacted] let's say, and see that there had been a big sale of a particular book which we had sponsored, which they knew we had sponsored but nobody else knew. Of course, [redacted] would have known about it, too.

So I would say that it was a pretty good fail-safe. The area of knowledgeability was high. For one thing, I traveled some in those days. I traveled to Bombay. I talked to the [redacted] there. I traveled to New Delhi and talked to [redacted] there, who was my CA opposite number, and

keep them up to date as to what we were planning. I would do the same in France and so forth.

Mr. Baron. Were there any specific instances that you know of of an eventual placement in the U.S. press of a story that the CIA generated or fabricated abroad somewhere? For instance, a story could conceivably be picked up by the UPI or by Reuters that the CIA had planted abroad.

Mr. Hunt. I can't recall anything significant. I would guess that during the Cuban, during the days of maximum Cuban operation that sort of thing happened. I would think it would be unavoidable, but I can't specify.

Mr. Baron. And are there any other instances than things you have mentioned of direct placements of stories in the U.S. press by the CIA?

Mr. Hunt. I have mentioned the [redacted] which was a cooperative venture with [redacted] the two [redacted] things. No, I can't recall.

Mr. Baron. I touched earlier upon the possibility of disseminating derogatory information about Agency targets. These were you aware of any general program of that nature to discredit either a foreign political leader or a foreign political faction, or domestic political groups or leaders?

Mr. Hunt. To the latter question, no. Domestic, I am not aware of any.

I think the Soviet Russia division was quite active, and it

kept a list, for example, and maintained a very good list of KGB officers abroad, and when one would show up at Luanda, for example, they would make sure that the local press got the man's dossier, or at least a blind handout so that they would know who the fellow was, much as the Butz counterspy operation is doing today against the CIA.

Mr. Baron. Did you make arrangements, or did you know of arrangements being made for non-CIA authors to write pieces that were favorable to the CIA?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. There was no funding of that kind of operaton?

Mr. Hunt. You mean sort of flackery, the favorable publicity for the Agency, is that what you imply?

Mr. Baron. Right.

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. What about subsidizing non-CIA authors to write stories of any sort, or books of any sort that the CIA was interested in having published?

Mr. Hunt. I would say this in a qualified sense. Where in the past we had given [redacted] a commitment to buy X copies of his book on the [redacted] problem, obviously we were subsidizing the author of that book because it was our money that [redacted] was ultimately passing to the individual, but that was [redacted] doing it rather than us. In

other words, there was never any face to face contact.

Mr. Baron. Aside from dealing through publishing houses that you had established contact with, did you deal individually with authors who were non-CIA employees?

Mr. Hunt. I did not. I don't think DOD did. I think that Far East Division did.

Mr. Baron. Do you know with whom?

Mr. Hunt. You mentioned Chinese [redacted] for example. Well, they dealt also, the Soviet Russia division dealt with [redacted] on the Penkoski case. In fact, I had lunch with [redacted] while he was doing the Penkoski Papers. So that was an example.

Mr. Baron. Did they have a regular program?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I think so.

Mr. Baron. Both of those two divisions?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that you think we would need in order to have a fairly clear, complete picture of the relations to the media or the publishing industry?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I think you could get probably a good deal more information from Cord Myer, who had a lot of that directly under him when he was Chief of the International Organizations Division, and of course, he served as Deputy Chief of Clandestine Services for quite a while. He would probably have as panoramic knowledge as anybody. I guess he's

was that we had made the -- the President had given certain undertakings to Cuban leadership and to our own paramilitary people, and had failed to carry them out.

However, this fact was successfully disguised for a number of years, but Dulles and Dick Bissell—paid the price.

In any events, the Bay of Pigs cost Dulles his leadership of the Agency, and I had the utmost respect for him. I was associated with him as an assistant for the special Cuban Bay of Pigs purposes, for a period of several months prior to, perhaps six months prior to his eventual retirement.

I had had occasional contacts with him as a Chief of Station, and I had seen him in Japan when he came over there and we had some discussions. Mr. Dulles brought into the formal Central Intelligence Agency the same feeling of esprit de corps that we had all enjoyed in the Office of Strategic Services, and this was largely lost during the McCone directorship. And I think we had some admiral after that, Admiral Radford, possibly. We got under a group of managers, and the human element that we had enjoyed in OSS was gone with the passage of Allen Dulles until Dick Helms came back in. You see, I'm an unrepentent admirer of Allen Dulles and the way we used to do business. Why do I say that? Because the way we did business during Mr. Dulles's directorate was precisely the way we did it in OSS during General Donovan's creation and direction of that organization. In OSS, which was Allan Dulles's training ground as much

COPY: WILL N...

SECRET

Exhibit: 7

FROM : MADRID

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, VR *

16 Sept 64

IN 75100

SECRET 161228Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY WAVE CITE MADR 1705

REF MADR 1681 IN 73706

1. CIA OFFICERS MET WITH SUBJ REF 15 SEPT. ONLY "IMPORTANT" INFO HE PROVIDED WAS VAGUE REFERENCE TO AGENT-1 PLAN ASSASSINATE CASTRO ATTEMPT WOULD SUPPOSEDLY TAKE PLACE DURING UNIVERSITY CEREMONY AT WHICH CASTRO PRESENT. AGENT-1 REPORTEDLY RESPONSIBLE ARRANGING DELIVERY CUBA ONE BELGIAN FAL EQUIPPED WITH SILENCER. AGENT-1 WAS TO BE TRIGGERMAN SUPPORTED BY UNIDEN ARMY OFFICERS. ABOVE PLAN NOW APPARENTLY ABANDONED.

2. SAID AGENT-1 ANXIOUS LEAVE CUBA ON OFFICIAL VISIT ORDER CONTACT CIA RE HIS FUTURE ROLE WITH CUBA. SUBJ SUGGESTED REMOTE POSSIBILITY ARRANGE VISIT PRAGUE THRU AGENT-1 FRIEND JOSE, DELEG TO IUS. OUR IMPRESSION IS AGENT-1 WANTS COME OUT FOR GOOD AS PROBABLY FEELS PERSONAL SITUATION TENUOUS.

3. ACCORDING SUBJ, FOLL PERSONS OR INFLUENCE ON AGENT-1 TEAM. MAJOR, MAJOR AND EX-MAJOR (FNU).

4. SAID AGENT-2 HAS NUMEROUS CONTACTS CUBAN OFFICIAL CIRCLES MADRID, PARIS, BUT WORKING FOR ANOTHER GOV'T. SINCE HE IN BAD STANDING WITH U.S.G. HINTED CIA SHOULD BE IN TOUCH AGENT-2 HOWEVER STATION HAS STRONG RESERVATIONS AGAINST AGENT-2 ON SECURITY GROUNDS

...D FROM

SECRET

AND FACT HE OUT FOR GOLD, PLUS LITTLE EVIDENCE CAPABILITY PRODUCE INFO OF INTEREST.

5. COS WHO LEFT MEETING FIRST, CLEARLY INFERRED TO SUBJ IT HAD BEEN "GREAT WASTE OF TIME." OTHER CIA OFFICER PROCEEDED POLITELY "CHEW OUT" SUBJ FOR GETTING US TO ABOVE MEET ON FALSE PRETENSES. SUBJ FRANKLY ADMITTED HIS "RECRUITMENT" BY CIS WAS HANDLED IN SUCH SLOPPY MANNER AS BE CONSTRUED A FARCE. VIEW VAGUENESS HIS MISSION AND LACK SECURE CONTACTS, REPORTING CHANNELS, IT APPARENT CIS NOT EXPECTING MUCH RESULTS FROM OP WHICH PROBABLY MADE ON "HIT OR MISS" BASIS. QUITE LIKELY "EDUARDO" WILL NEVER APPEAR TO CONTACT SUBJ.

6. SEEING HIS "UTILITY" TO US AS DUBIOUS, SUBJ BEGAN SCRATCHIN HEAD FOR LEADS AND MENTIONED FOLL "FRIENDS" HE MIGHT CONTACT: ORLANDO BLANCO (NO RELATION), CHARGE IN BERN WHO COMING BARC 25 SEPT; (FNU) TRASANCO OF PAIR EMB WHO CONFIDANTE AMLASH 1 ALSO KNOWN AMLASH 2; AND ENRIQUE RODRIQUEZ LOECHES, AMB TO MOROCCO WHO COMING MADRID 20 SEPT.


7. C/O SAID NOW UP TO SUBJ SHOW BONAFIDES SUGGESTING HE WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE HIS "UNIQUE STATUS" AS CUBAN AGENT GAIN ENTRY OFFICIAL CIRCLES. SUBJ FEARS WE MAY DENY VISA AND DENOUNCE HIM TO SPANISH POLICE. ALTHOUGH HE PROMISED MAKE EVERY EFFORT, INDICATIONS TO DATE ARE HE WILL HAVE LITTLE, IF ANY, OPS UTILITY. IN ANY EVENT WAS TOLD EXAMINE THOROUGHLY ANY LEADS HE MIGHT HAVE IN NEXT FEW DAYS. WE WILL DECIDE IN NEXT MEETING OR TWO WHETHER HE DOES APPEAR TO HAVE ANY UTILITY, IF NOT HE WILL BE DROPPED.

S E C R E T

*DISSEM APPLICABLE TO SENSITIVE CABLES

Exhibit





# Retired Colonel Denies Heading C.I.A. Unit for Assassinations

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 — A retired Army colonel has denied to Senate investigators an assertion by E. Howard Hunt Jr. that the colonel once headed a Central Intelligence Agency unit set up to arrange for the assassinations of suspected double-agents.

The colonel, Boris T. Pash, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence yesterday that during 1954 and 1955—the period in which Mr. Hunt, a former C.I.A. officer, said he was told that Colonel Pash ran such an operation—he had left the C.I.A. and returned to military service.

In a statement made public by the panel today, Colonel Pash termed Mr. Hunt's assertions "insidious and completely false.

He said he could not recall ever having met or spoken with Mr. Hunt, who is serving a prison term for his role in the Watergage case.

Nor, the colonel said, was he ever "involved in any assassination planning" between 1949 and 1951, the period in which he was temporarily assigned to the C.I.A., or at any other time in his career.

Mr. Hunt said in a recent interview that during his service with the C.I.A.'s Balkans division in the mid-1950's he had discussed with Colonel Pash, at his superiors' behest, the prospective assassination of an individual who was believed to be a double agent.

"I was told that we had that capability," Mr. Hunt said in the interview, and "that the guy to see about this sort of things was Colonel Pash."

Mr. Hunt, who said that he had understood that Colonel Pash was deceased, added that he did discuss the matter with the colonel, who seemed shocked "that the subject has ever been brought up," and that the matter consequently was left there.

Investigators for the Senate committee are now attempting to interview Mr. Hunt about this assertion, a committee spokesman said.

## SPANISH TROOPS RUN SUBWAY IN MADRID

MADRID, Jan. 7 (AP)—The Spanish Army began running the Madrid subway system today as the Government moved gingerly to break a three-day wildcat strike that set off the worst traffic snarl in the city's history.

Fearing a possible labor backlash, the Government refrained for the moment, however, from drafting the rebellious subway workers into service.

About 3,000 electric company workers marched into the center of Madrid in support of the subway workers and the police used tear gas to disperse them. The police said they broke up similar demonstrations by factory workers on the city's outskirts. No arrests or injuries were reported.

Army personnel trained as railroad engineers reopened the main subway line, which runs through the center of the capital between working-class neighborhoods. Passengers were admitted free.

MADRID, Jan. 7 (Reuters)—Striking Madrid subway workers tonight voted to defy Government pressure and to continue their walk-out. Strike leaders said they would hold out until their wage demands were met.

The strikers voted not to accept an offer from the official Government-run union to hold talks if they returned to work.

BARCELONA, Spain, Jan. 7 (AP)—The Rev. Luis María Xirinachs, an outspoken Roman Catholic priest nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize last year, was arrested today while demonstrating near the local prison in support of amnesty for political prisoners, police sources said.

REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST!










Exhibit 1

STATEMENT BY E. HOWARD HUNT

A year ago when Congress established the Church Committee, Senator Baker was quoted as saying that I would be an early witness. I was then free on Appeal and readily available to testify concerning CIA involvement in allegedly illegal activities. Moreover, I viewed testifying before the Committee as a further opportunity to testify under oath concerning my total non-involvement with Messrs Oswald, Bremer and Sirhan, persons with whom my name has been slanderously and libelously linked in press and electronic media. Although I had been interviewed previously by the FBI and the Rockefeller Commission with regard to these allegations a host of assassination buffs and media advocates continued irresponsibly to associate me with the deaths of the Kennedy brothers and the crippling of Governor Wallace.

My Appeal denied, I re-entered prison in April,1975. Three weeks later US Marshals escorted me to Washington DC for what turned out to be a three-hour interview with a new Watergate Assistant Special Prosecutor. For a 9-day period I was lodged at the Leesburg, Va., jail,and finally returned via Detroit and Tallahassee where I was imprisoned in the isolation area before being driven on May 26 to Eglin Federal Prison Camp. On May 27, Assistant Committee Counsel Michael Madigan telephoned me to say that the Church Committee wanted to interview me "within the next two weeks". I apprised Mr. Madigan of Public Law 93-209, Title 18. Sec.4082(c) Para. 1 (amended) which authorises minimum security prisoners such as myself to be furloughed for up to 30 days for purposes of testifying. Counsel Madigan agreed to my testifying on this furlough basis.

Over the summer,however, I heard nothing further from Mr. Madigan or his Committee associates. Then in mid-September a Washington POST story alleged that I had been assigned by a White House superior to assassinate columnist Jack Anderson. Senator Church was thereupon quoted as saying that his Committee would investigate the charges. I welcomed this apparent

opportunity, for the allegations had gained wide credence while my own delayed response appeared only incompletely in the press. Still, nothing was heard from the Committee.

In December 1975 John Crewdson of the New York Times interviewed me in prison. He asked if I knew anything about "CIA assassination capabilities", and I related to him my encounter with Col. Boris T. Pash. Mr. Crewdson then inquired whether the Church Committee had interviewed me. I responded in terms of the foregoing, noting that I would have testified about the Pash encounter had I been given the publicized opportunities. My interview with Mr. Crewdson was published and shortly thereafter my attorney was contacted by a representative of the Committee.

I consider it highly discriminatory that the Committee is unwilling to have me testify in Washington as a furloughed witness. Further, the Committee's refusal to postpone interviewing me in prison until one of two counsel familiar with my career and affairs is available places me in a difficult position with regard to representation by informed legal counsel. And, as during the Ervin Committee hearings ( whose cost in legal fees to me approached $100,000) I must again pay legal fees occasioned by the interest of the Senate in a matter of no discernible benefit to me.


Between last January and April I could freely have traveled to Washington to testify at the pleasure of the Senate. From then on I could have been furloughed for that purpose and testified accompanied by customary counsel who are not now available to me. Nevertheless, in demonstration of my willingness to cooperate fully with the Senate I agree to be interviewed under oath today.

E. Howard Hunt

E. Howard Hunt

January 10, 1976


Exhibit 3




S Div.
C/PP/SE
HUNT
C/FI/SE
C/SE - BAKER + RICHARDSON
DC/SE
ALBANIA
[redacted]
RUMANIA
GREECE
YUGOSLAVIA
TRIESTE
BULGARIA
[redacted] BASE
[redacted] BASE
W. GERMAN UNIT

Exhibit 4

# PP STAFF



Exh #5



p 8 Jan 11 —

line 13 reached

15 I

14 5 – NONE

15 6 – flashed

24 l. 10 at

28 l. 22 ease

33 l. 10 JON

43 17 20

6

p. 9. line 14: subs: "for" for "with".

line 15 – quotes.

10 – J–K–L

p. 19 line 15 – LEWIS

p. 22 line 15 – [redacted]

17 et. seq. = HARVEY

25 l. 21 – The Special Group

30 l. 13 – NAGUIB

45 l. 4 – J OR K

l. 5 – [redacted]

[illegible] l. 8 TRACY

Jan 10

p 66 l. 15 aside

l. 23 BARON

67A 26 Giving

67 l. 5, 12, 15, 18, 23

76 – l. 11 – Y

77 l. 5 – "COUNTERSPY"

78 l. 10, 11 Y